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(2 pages)
Cost of Livestock Produc-
tion – B1-20 (24 pages)
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Federal court strikes down Nebraska 
corporate farming law*
by Roger McEowen, associate professor of agricultural law, (515) 294-4076, 
mceowen@iastate.edu and Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Pro-
fessor in Agriculture and Emeritus Professor of Economics, Iowa State Univer-
sity, Ames, Iowa. Member of the Iowa Bar, harl@iastate.edu
In late 2005, the Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska held, in Jones, et 
al.  v. Gale, et al., that the Ne-
braska Constitutional provision 
restricting unauthorized corporate 
involvement in certain types of 
agricultural activities is unconsti-
tutional on “dormant commerce 
clause” grounds and on the basis 
that the provision violates the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). The Nebraska Attorney 
General is appealing the ruling to 
the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, which 
has ruled twice on anti-corpo-
rate farming restrictions in other 
states in recent years. The case 
represents the most recent judicial 
pronouncement concerning the 
ability of a particular state’s citi-
zenry to shape the future structure 
of agriculture within that state.
Overview - Anti-Corporate 
Farming Restrictions. 
Presently, nine states prohibit 
corporations from engaging in 
agriculture to various degrees. 
The restrictions grew out of rising 
concern across the country that 
several key sectors of the U.S. 
economy were becoming con-
trolled by a few large firms and 
multi-state corporations. While 
the laws are not designed to slow 
down or prevent structural change 
in agriculture, they are designed 
to control the organizational form 
of farming operations based on 
ownership arrangements. Until 
recently, no appellate-level court 
at either the state or federal levels 
had ever held a state anti-corpo-
rate farming law unconstitutional.
Initiative 300. 
The Nebraska anti-corporate 
farming law (I-300) was added 
to the state Constitution in 1982 
by voters through the initiative 
and referendum process. The law 
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prohibits a corporation or syndicate from acquiring 
or obtaining an interest in any title to real estate used 
for farming or ranching in Nebraska, or from engag-
ing in farming or ranching in the state.  A syndicate 
is defined as a limited partnership other than a 
limited partnership in which the partners are mem-
bers of a family or a trust created for the benefit of a 
member of the family, related to one another within 
the fourth degree of kindred (first cousins) or their 
spouses, at least one of whom is a person residing 
on or actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and 
management of the farm or ranch. Numerous excep-
tions exist, but the major one is for family farm or 
ranch corporations (defined as a majority of the vot-
ing stock held by members of the family) or a trust 
created for the benefit of a member of the family. The 
majority shareholders must be related to each other 
within the fourth degree of kindred (or be the spouse 
of a family member), and at least one family member 
must either reside on the farm or be actively engaged 
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm.
Jones, et al. v. Gale, et al. 
The plaintiffs were engaged in agricultural activi-
ties to a certain degree. They all claimed that I-300 
barred their proposed activities and challenged the 
law on the basis that it violated the “dormant com-
merce clause,” the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Two of the plaintiffs were disabled and claimed 
that I-300 also violated the ADA because of the 
requirement that at least one family member be “a 
person residing on or actively engaged in the day to 
day labor and management of the farm or ranch.”
The “Dormant Commerce Clause.” 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
forbids discrimination against commerce, which 
repeatedly has been held to mean that state and 
localities may not discriminate against the transac-
tions of out-of-state actors in interstate markets even 
when the Congress has not legislated on the subject. 
The overriding rationale of the commerce clause was 
to create and foster the development of a common 
market among the states and to eradicate internal 
trade barriers. Thus, a state may not enact rules or 
regulations requiring out-of–state commerce to be 
conducted according to the enacting state’s terms. So, 
states have the power to regulate economic activity 
within their borders, but cannot do so in a discrimi-
natory manner. If the state has been motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose, the state bears the burden 
to show that it is pursuing a legitimate purpose that 
cannot be achieved with a nondiscriminatory al-
ternative. However, if the state regulates without a 
discriminatory purpose but with a legitimate pur-
pose, the provision will be upheld unless the burden 
on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the benefits that the state derives from the regula-
tion. In essence, a state is free to regulate economic 
transactions occurring within its borders in the man-
ner it deems appropriate as long as it is done in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion, but is not free to regulate 
economic conduct occurring elsewhere.
The court’s “dormant commerce clause” 
analysis. 
The court held that I-300 was facially discriminatory 
because it “was conceived and born in protectionist 
fervor,” and that the ballot title and language of I-300 
clearly indicated that Nebraskans would be given 
“favored treatment” on the basis that it would be 
more economically feasible for those living in close 
proximity to Nebraska farm and ranches to provide 
“day-to-day physical labor and management.” As 
such, the court continued down the path established 
by the Eighth Circuit in two earlier cases involving 
anti-corporate farming laws from South Dakota and 
Iowa, where the court did not examine the actual 
impact on economic conduct by in-state and out-of-
state firms, instead relying on statements of legisla-
tors and ballot titles to find discrimination against 
interstate commerce. But, the court appeared to go 
even further when it stated, “When it is apparent 
from the language of a …state constitutional amend-
ment…that its effect is to burden out-of state eco-
nomic interests and benefit in-state economic inter-
ests, the party challenging it should not be required 
to bear the burden of an evidentiary hearing to prove 
the obvious” [emphasis added]. Unfortunately, the 
court did not provide any explanation as to how the 
text of I-300, by itself, can have a discriminatory 
impact on interstate commerce. While the court was 
correct to examine the text of I-300, the text clearly 
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applies to any corporation or syndicate “organized 
under the laws of any state of the United States.” The 
provision does not provide preferential treatment for 
Nebraska firms as compared to out-of-state firms. All 
firms wishing to engage in agricultural activities in 
Nebraska are subject to an identical set of rules, as 
far as I-300 is concerned. Consequently, an appro-
priate question is whether I-300 burdens interstate 
commerce excessively in relation to the benefits that 
the state derives from I-300. That is not likely to 
be the case, particularly since I-300 does not con-
tain any prohibition against agricultural contracting 
activities. 
The court also found a discriminatory effect associ-
ated with the requirement that a family member pro-
vide (as the court referred to it) “day-to-day physical 
labor and management.” The actual language of 
I-300 requires that a family member of a qualified 
entity be a “person residing on or actively engaged 
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm 
or ranch…” The test is one of active engagement and 
not, as the court put it, the provision of “day-to-day 
physical labor and management.” While the court 
relied on Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., for its reasoning, 
that case involved the construction of the terms “la-
bor” and “management” and did not directly address 
the question of the meaning of “active engagement” 
in the context of the provision of labor and manage-
ment. There is authority for the notion that “active 
engagement” requires much less than actually ren-
dering labor and management on the premises.  For 
example, under USDA payment limitation rules, one 
of the requirements that a farmer (or otherwise eligi-
ble entity) must satisfy to be eligible for federal farm 
program payments is the active engagement test. As 
part of the active engagement test, the individual (or 
entity) must make a significant contribution of active 
personal labor or active personal management (or a 
combination thereof). While hired services do not 
count, it is clear that active personal management 
need not be performed on the farm to satisfy the test 
– a person can contribute active personal manage-
ment while living in a distant town. Active engage-
ment in labor activities can be achieved via contract. 
In any event, under I-300, the mere fact that the 
shareholder resides on the farm negates the require-
ment that the shareholder be actively engaged in the 
day to day labor and management of the farm.
The ADA Claim. 
The Court also found that I-300 was invalid un-
der the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause because 
it conflicted with the ADA on the basis that two of 
the plaintiffs were disabled and could not perform 
the daily physical labor that the court believed 
I-300 required. The ADA provides that “no quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be discriminated by 
any such entity.” While the court noted that “public 
entity” has been construed broadly to apply to all 
actions of state and local governments, the court did 
not address the point that I-300 did not involve the 
action of a governmental body. Instead, I-300 was 
the result of the initiative and referendum process 
and was approved by Nebraska voters. No action 
or activity of government was involved. The court 
also did not address the applicability of the ADA to 
Nebraska farming operations. The ADA only applies 
to “employers” that have 15 or more employees for 
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 
Conclusion. 
The court’s opinion appears to be seriously flawed in 
several respects. However, it is questionable whether 
the opinion will be reversed on appeal. Except for 
its opinion in Hampton, the Eighth Circuit has not 
shown much willingness to analyze deeply the dor-
mant commerce clause issue. If the decision stands, 
it will have a dampening effect on a state’s efforts to 
ensure competitive markets for agricultural products 
and a level playing field for independent agricul-
tural producers. Increased pressure could also be 
placed on the Congress to address the anti-competi-
tive effects of concentrated agricultural markets and 
vertically integrated agricultural production supply 
chains.
continued on page 4
* Reprinted with permission from the January 6, 2006 issue of 
Agricultural Law Digest, Agricultural Law Press Publications, 
Eugene, Oregon. Footnotes not included.
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One of the most gripping story lines of recent years is the one in which after a crime is committed, law enforcement of-
ficials become so focused on “the obvious suspect” 
that they ignore evidence that may point them 
toward other suspects. After the suspect is convict-
ed, it has often taken decades before new forensic 
tools free “the obvious suspect” and identify some-
one else as responsible for the crime.
A similar story line is being played out in the 
debate over trade and the US farm program. Many 
of those looking for the reason for low commod-
ity prices are so focused on “the obvious suspect” 
(increased production resulting from US subsidies) 
that they ignore evidence that may lead them to 
consider other causes for the low prices.
The argument asserts that US subsidies have 
stimulated US farmers to produce a considerably 
greater crop volume than they would have without 
the subsidies. The result of this “overproduction” 
is lower prices that are harming farmers in other 
countries. In addition, many are authoritatively 
asserting that eliminating subsidies will result in 
lower production on the part of US producers and 
higher prices for all farmers. Based on this rea-
soning the argument calls either for putting out a 
contract (in the Godfather sense) on all subsidies 
or reassigning subsidies to a World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) approved “good-works” environ-
mental and other “multifunctional” projects.
Over the last three columns we have presented evi-
dence challenging both the methodology and focus 
of a case that has the potential to be played out 
before a WTO disputes panel. The potential WTO 
case that has been laid out in several forms would 
involve a challenge by a soybean, corn, wheat, or 
exporting country asserting that US subsidies have 
encouraged overproduction resulting in lower 
prices.
Our first response was that in examining the 
impact of subsidies, one needs to take the lack of 
price responsiveness on the part of both producers 
and consumers into account. Because farmers are 
price-takers and not price-makers, most of them 
will tell you that they have every incentive to try to 
maximize production in order reduce the per-unit 
cost of production. That allows farmers to spread 
the high fixed costs out over a greater amount of 
production, as long as the price is above the vari-
able cost of production.
We then argued that the effect of subsidies cannot 
be looked at one crop at a time because most US 
farmers grow more than one crop and a reduction 
in corn plantings does not mean that the land will 
be left idle. Instead, acres shifted out of corn will 
be planted to soybeans or another crop, leaving 
total acreage relatively unchanged – this is the 
low price responsiveness that we talked about. 
At most, the subsidies may be responsible for a 
three-tenths of one percent change in production. 
Looking at the crops one at a time runs afoul of the 
fallacy of composition.
Last week we argued that with low price respon-
siveness, it is not the subsidies per se that are 
responsible for the low prices, but rather the 
“market-oriented” Loan Deficiency Payment/Mar-
keting Loan Gain (LDP/MLG) program. In fact the 
LDP/MLGs were designed to protect US producers 
while allowing the US price to drop to the world 
price. What the designers of this program failed to 
understand was that producers in other countries 
usually sell their crops for a discount off the US 
In the agricultural “whodunit,” subsidies may not be the 
prime suspect
by Daryll E. Ray, Blasingame Chair, Excellence in Agricultural Policy, Institute of Agricul-
ture, University of Tennessee, and Director, UT Agricultural Policy Analysis Center (APAC). 
(865)974-7407; dray@utk.edu; http://www.agpolicy.org
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price. As a result, LDP/MLGs have allowed prices 
to fall below the loan rate with most of the benefits 
being picked up by integrated cattle feeders, im-
porting countries, and the transporters and proces-
sors of grains and seeds.
Ignored in the discussion of trade distorting sub-
sidies is the impact of government funded agricul-
tural research and extension programs. In WTO 
parlance these payments are put in the green box 
and are considered non-trade distorting. We find it 
hard to understand how research programs which 
increase yield potential and decrease crop loss can 
be considered to have no impact on trade. By their 
very nature these programs result in increased pro-
duction and, in the presence of weak price respon-
siveness, lower prices.
We are not arguing for the elimination of agricul-
tural research and extension programs, but rather 
for recognition that the fruits of this research have 
had more impact on increasing the supply of food 
than farm subsidies. Since 1996, US corn and 
soybean yields have increased by 16 percent and 
much of this gain has its roots in basic research 
that can be tied to government funding.
If US subsidies are the cause of low prices, then 
we should see a different picture for those crops 
for which the US has no subsidies and no tariffs. 
Absent the presence of US programs these crops 
should have stable prices. Between 1980 and 
2002, cocoa prices fell by 58 percent, coffee prices 
fell by 70 percent and pepper prices fell by 32 
percent. Clearly US subsidies are not the cause of 
these low prices.
If both unsubsidized tropical crops and subsidized 
temperate zone crops have similar price/income 
problems, then maybe we should look at some-
thing other than “the obvious suspect:” subsidies. 
And that other suspect is the low price responsive-
ness for aggregate crop agriculture, both tropical 
and temperate.
On June 24, 2005, the Federal Register (at page 36,557) carried a Notice of Deter-mination by the Secretary of Agriculture 
that payments under the Conservation Security 
Program, under criteria specified in the USDA 
regulations, are “. . . primarily for the purpose of 
conserving soil and water resources or protect-
ing and restoring the environment.” The Secretary 
is charged with making such a determination in 
order for the payments to be eligible for the cost 
share exclusion available under federal income tax 
law. The Secretary of the Treasury is obligated to 
make a determination that the payments under the 
program do not increase “. . . substantially the an-
nual income derived from the property.”
The Secretary of Agriculture, in the June 24, 2005 
notice, proceeded to state that “. . . this determi-
nation permits recipients to exclude from gross 
income, for Federal income tax purposes, all or 
part of the existing practice, new practice, and 
enhancement activity payments under the extent 
allowed by the Internal Revenue Service.” Howev-
er, as discussed in a November 18, 2005 Agricul-
tural Law Digest article**, the exclusion provision 
is limited to “capital improvements.” Cost-share 
payments for the adoption of land-based structural 
practices should be eligible for the exclusion from 
income if the practice is a capital improvement.” 
Cost-share payments for the adoption or main-
More on handling CSP payments*
-by Neil E. Harl , Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture 
and Emeritus Professor of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
Member of the Iowa Bar, harl@iastate.edu
. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits dis-
crimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability, 
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family 
status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) 
Many materials can be made available in alternative formats 
for ADA clients. To file a complaint of discrimination, write 
Permission to copy
Permission is given to reprint ISU Extension materials 
contained in this publication via copy machine or other 
copy technology, so long as the source (Ag Decision 
Maker Iowa State University Extension ) is clearly 
identifiable and the appropriate author is properly 
credited.
USDA, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Build-
ing, 14th and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 
20250-9410 or call 202-720-5964.
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts 
of May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Jack M. Payne, director, Coopera-
tive Extension Service, Iowa State University of Science and 
Technology, Ames, Iowa. 
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Internet updates
The following updates have been added to www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm.
How to Use Grants – C5-08 (3 pages)
Creating a Mission Statement, Setting Goals and Developing Strategies (action plans) – C5-09 
(4 pages)
When to Do and How to Use a Feasibility Study – C5-64 (2 pages)
What is a Feasibility Study? – C5-65 (3 pages)
Feasibility Study Outline – C5-66 (4 pages)
Writing a Value-Added Business Plan – C5-68 (3 pages)
More on handling CSP Payments, continued from page 5
* Reprinted with permission from the December 16, 2005 
issue of Agricultural Law Digest, Agricultural Law Press Publi-
cations, Eugene, Oregon. Footnotes not included.
** This article appeared in the January issue of the Ag Deci-
sion Maker newsletter.
tenance of management or vegetative practices 
would not be excludible from income nor would 
“existing practice, new practice, and enhance-
ment activity payments” necessarily be excludible 
from income. Those payments are very likely to be 
reportable as ordinary income except to the extent 
the payments are for capital improvements. 
The misleading statement in the June 24, 2005 
Notice has contributed to the belief by some tax-
payers, augmented by statements from Natural Re-
source Conservation Service offices, that perhaps 
the entire amount of CSP payments could be ex-
cluded from income.  That would only be possible 
if the entire payment amount were to be directed 
into capital improvements. Considering the nature 
of the CSP program, that is highly unlikely.
